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Abstract. In order to handle the complexity and heterogeneity of mod-
ern instruction set architectures, analysis platforms share a common
design, the adoption of hardware-independent intermediate representa-
tions. The usage of these platforms to verify systems down to binary-level
is appealing due to the high degree of automation they provide. How-
ever, it introduces the need for trusting the correctness of the translation
from binary code to intermediate language. Achieving a high degree of
trust is challenging since this transpilation must handle (i) all the side
effects of the instructions, (ii) multiple instruction encoding (e.g. ARM
Thumb), and (iii) variable instruction length (e.g. Intel). We overcome
these problems by formally modeling one of such intermediate languages
in the interactive theorem prover HOL4 and by implementing a proof-
producing transpiler. This tool translates ARMv8 programs to the in-
termediate language and generates a HOL4 proof that demonstrates the
correctness of the translation in the form of a simulation theorem. We
also show how the transpiler theorems can be used to transfer properties
verified on the intermediate language to the binary code.
Keywords: binary analysis, formal verification, proof producing analy-
sis, theorem proving
1 Introduction
Despite the existence of formally verified compilers, the verification of binary
code is a critical task to guarantee trustworthiness of critical systems. This is
particularly necessary for software mixing high-level language with assembly
(system software), using ad-hoc languages and compilers (specialized software),
in presence of instruction set extensions (like encryption and decryption), and
when the source code is not available (binary blobs). This necessity is not only
limited to the general-purpose computing scenario but also applies to connected
embedded systems, where software bugs can enable a remote attacker to tamper
with the security of automobiles, payment services, and smart IoT devices.
The need of semi-automatic analysis techniques for binary code has lead to
the development of several tools [25,7,24]. To handle the complexity and hetero-
geneity of modern instruction set architectures (ISAs), all these tools followed
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a common design: They have introduced a platform independent intermediate
representation that allows to implement analysis independently of (i) names and
number of registers, (ii) instruction decoding, (iii) endianness of memory access,
and (iv) instruction side-effects (like updating conditional flags or the stack
pointer). This intermediate representation is often a dialect of the Valgrind’s
IR [21]. Soundness of the transpiler (i.e. the tool translating from machine code
to intermediate language) should not be foregone: It may have to handle mul-
tiple instruction encoding (e.g. ARM Thumb), variable instruction length (e.g.
Intel), and complex side effects of instructions (e.g. ARM branch with link and
conditional executions). Clearly, a transpiler bug jeopardizes the soundness of
all analyses done on the intermediate representation.
Our strategy to handle this issue is to use formal models of the ISA and of the
intermediate language of the analyses platform, and to formally demonstrate that
the transpilation is correct. We chose ARMv8 [17] as demonstrating ISA, reusing
the model for the HOL4 theorem prover that was previously developed in [10,9].
For the target language, we implemented a deep-embedding of the Intermediate
Language of the Binary Analysis Platform [7] (BIL) in the HOL4 logic and
implemented its small-step semantics. Verification of the transpilation is done
via a HOL4 proof producing transpiler, which translates ARMv8 programs to
BIL programs, and yields the HOL4 proof that demonstrates its correctness.
The theorem establishes a simulation between the input binary program and the
generated BIL program, showing that the two programs have the same behavior.
Our contribution enables a verifier to prove properties of the generated BIL
program (i.e. by directly using the theorem prover or proof-producing analysis
techniques) and to transfer them to the original ARMv8 program using the
generated simulation theorems.
Outline We present the state of the art and the previous works relating to our
contribution in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the HOL4 formal models of the
ARMv8 ISA and the BIL language. Section 4 presents the certifying transpiler.
We demonstrate that the theorems produced by the transpiler can be used to
transfer verification conditions in Section 5, where we test and evaluate our
development too. We give concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Related work
Recent works have shown that formal techniques are ready to achieve detailed
verification of real software, making it possible to provide low-level platforms
with unprecedented security guarantees [13,1,8]. For such system software, lim-
iting the verification to the source code level is undesirable. A modern compiler
(e.g. GCC) consists of several millions of lines of code, in contrast to micro-
kernels that consist of few thousand lines of code, making it difficult to trust the
compiler output even when optimization is disabled3.
3 An example of a very recent bug found in GCC: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/
show_bug.cgi?id=80180
To overcome this limitation, formally verified compilers [15,6,14] and proof-
producing compilers [16] have been developed. Similarly to our work, these com-
pilers use detailed models of the underlying ISA to show the correctness of their
output. This usually involves a simulation theorem, which demonstrates that the
behavior of the produced binary code resembles the one specified by the seman-
tics of the high level language (e.g. C or ML). These theorems permit properties
verified at the source-level to be automatically transferred to the binary-level. For
instance, CompCert has been used in [3] to verify security of OpenSSL HMAC
by transferring functional correctness of the source code to the produced binary.
Even if formally verified compilers obviate the need for trusting their output,
they do not fulfill all the needs of verified system software. Some of these com-
pilers target languages that are unsuitable for developing system software (e.g.
ML cannot be used to develop a microkernel due to its garbage collector). Also,
they do not support mixing the high-level language with assembly code, which
is necessary for storing and restoring the CPU context or for managing the page
table. Some of the effects of these operations can break the assumptions made
to define a precise semantics of the high level language (e.g. a memory write
can alter the page table which in turn affects the virtual memory layout). Also,
some properties (e.g. absence of side channels due to non-secure accesses to the
caches) cannot be verified at the source code level; the analysis must be aware
of the exact sequence of memory accesses performed by the software. Finally,
binary blob analysis is imperative for verifying memory safety of binary code
whose source code is not available (e.g. the power management of ARM trusted
firmware).
Unfortunately, detailed formal specifications of machine languages (e.g. the
ones used to verify compiler correctness [11]) consist of thousands of lines of
definitions. The complexity of these models makes them unusable to directly
verify any binary code that is not a toy example. Moreover, the target verification
tools, usually interactive theorem provers, provide little or no support for either
automatic reasoning or reuse of algorithms among different hardware models.
To make machine-code verification proofs reusable by different architectures,
Myreen et al. [20] developed a proof-producing decompilation procedure. Those
tools have been implemented in the HOL4 system and have been used by the
seL4 project to check that the binary code produced by the compiler is correct,
permitting to transfer properties verified at the source code level to the actual
binary code executed by the CPU [22]. The same framework has been used
to verify a bignum integer library [19]. However, the automatism provided by
this framework is still far from what is provided by today’s binary analysis
platforms (e.g. [25,7,24]). These provide tools to compute and analyze control-
flow graphs, to perform abstract interpretation and symbolic execution, to verify
contracts, and to verify information flow properties [2]. On the other hand, their
usage requires to trust the used transpiler. Due to the complexity of writing
a transpiler for each architecture, recent work has been done to synthesize the
transpiler from compiler backends [12]. However, this requires to trust both: the
synthesis procedure and the compiler backend.
In this paper, we address this issue by providing sound transpilation of
ARMv8 binary code to the intermediate language of BAP. BAP is an analy-
sis platform that provides utilities to compute and analyze control-flow graphs,
to transform programs (e.g. by unrolling cycles), to verify contracts via genera-
tion of weakest preconditions and their export to SMT solvers. The platform has
also been externally extended with tools for information flow security based on
relational analysis. We developed a HOL4 formal model of the BAP intermediate
language, which can be used to provide precise semantics of programs expressed
in BIL and to verify soundness of analysis tools. This allows us to implement
a proof-producing transpiler, which can translate an ARMv8 program to a BIL
program while generating a HOL4 proof that demonstrates its correctness.
3 Formal HOL4 models
3.1 The ARMv8 model
In our work, we use the ARMv8 model developed by Fox [10], which is con-
structed from the pseudocode described in the ARM specification [17] and pro-
vides a detailed HOL4 formalization of the effects of the instructions, taking
into account the different execution modes, flags, and other characteristics of
the processor behavior.
The system state is modeled as a tuple s = 〈r, sr, p, c,m〉. Here, r represents
a sequence of 64-bit general purpose registers. We identify the i-th register with
r(i). The tuple sr = 〈pc, sp, lr〉 contains the special registers representing the
program counter, the stack pointer, and the link register respectively. The tuple
p representing the current processor state and contains the arithmetical flags,
the execution mode, and the interrupt disabling. The tuple c encodes the system
and coprocessor registers, it also contains the current endianness and the con-
figuration of the Memory Management Unit. The 64-bit addressable memory is
modeled as the function m : B64 → B8. Finally, the system behavior is repre-
sented by the deterministic transition relation s→ s′, describing how the ARM
state s reaches the state s′ by executing a single instruction. Hereafter, we use .
to access tuple fields; for example s.sr.pc states for the program counter of the
state s.
The HOL4 model consists of hundreds of definitions and its complexity makes
it difficult to analyze large programs. To simplify the analyses, the model is
equipped with a mechanism to statically compute the effects of a single instruc-
tion via the arm step function. Let i be the binary encoding of an instruc-
tion and ad be the address where the instruction is stored, then the function
arm step(i, ad) returns a list of step theorems [st1, . . . , stn]. Each theorem stj
has the following structure:
∀s. read32(s.m, s.sr.pc) = i ∧ s.sr.pc = ad ∧ cj(s)⇒ s→ tj(s)
where read32 is a function that reads 32 bits from the memory. Intuitively, each
step theorem describes one of the possible behaviors of the instruction and con-
sists of the guard condition cj that enables the transition and the function tj
that transforms the starting state into the next state. We use three examples to
illustrate this mechanism.
Let the instruction stored at the address 0x1000000c be the addition of the
registers x0 and x1 into the register x0 (whose encoding is 0x8b000020), the
step function produces the following step theorem:
∀s. read32(s.m, s.sr.pc) = 0x8b000020 ∧ s.sr.pc = 0x1000000c⇒
s→ (λs′.s′ with r(0) = s′.r(0) + s′.r(1) with sr.pc = s′.sr.pc+ 4 ) s
(where s′ with r(0) = v updates the register zero of the state s′ with v). In this
case, only one theorem is generated, and there is no guard condition (i.e. c1 is a
tautology).
Some ARMv8 instructions (i.e. conditional branches) can have different be-
havior according to the value of some state components. In these cases, the step
function produces as many theorems as the number of possible execution cases.
For example, the output of the step function for the Signed Greater Than (GT)
branch consists of the following two theorems:
∀s. read32(s.m, s.sr.pc) = 0x54fffe8c ∧ s.sr.pc = 0x1000000c
∧ s.p.Z = 0 ∧ s.p.N = s.p.V⇒
s→ (λs′.s′ with sr.pc = s′.sr.pc− 0x30)s
∀s. read32(s.m, s.sr.pc) = 0x54fffe8c ∧ s.sr.pc = 0x1000000c
∧¬ (s.p.Z = 0 ∧ s.p.N = s.p.V)⇒
s→ (λs′.s′ with sr.pc = s′.sr.pc+ 4)s
That is, if the test succeeds (i.e. c1 = s.p.Z = 0 ∧ s.p.N = s.p.V holds) then the
jump is taken (in this case jumping back in a loop to the address pc − 0x30),
otherwise (i.e. c2 = ¬(s.p.Z = 0 ∧ s.p.N = s.p.V) holds) the jump is not taken
(the program counter is updated to point to the next instruction). Notice that
for every state s the condition c1 ∨ c2 hold.
Finally, some ARMv8 instructions (i.e. memory stores) can have unsound
behavior if some conditions are not met. In these cases, the step function gener-
ates the step theorems only for the correct behaviors; for a given instruction, let
st1, . . . , stn be the generated theorems and c1, . . . , cn the corresponding guards,
the behavior of the instruction is soundly deduced by the step function for every
state s such that
∨
j cj(s) holds and can not be deduced otherwise. For example,
the output of the step function for a memory store consists of the theorem:
∀s. read32(s.m, s.sr.pc) = 0xf90007e0 ∧ s.sr.pc = 0x1000000c
∧ aligned(s.sr.sp+ 8)⇒
s→
(
λs′.s′ with m = write64(s′.m, s′.sr.sp + 8, s′.r(0))
with sr.pc = s′.sr.pc+ 4
)
s
Intuitively, the step function can predict the behavior only for states having the
target address (i.e. s.sr.sp+ 8) aligned.
3.2 The BIL model
The target of our transpilation is BIL. In this language, a statement has only
explicit state changes, i.e. there are no implicit side effects, and it can only affect
one variable.
BIL’s syntax is depicted in Table 1. A program is a list of blocks, each
one consisting of a uniquely identifying label (i.e. a string or an integer) and a
list of atomic statements. A statement can affect the state by (i) assigning the
evaluation of an expression to a variable, (ii) (conditionally or unconditionally)
modifying the control flow, (iii) halting the system in a successful state, and
(iv) terminating the system in a failure state if an assertion does not hold. As
usual, labels are used to refer to the specific locations in the program and can
be the target of jump statements. BIL expressions are built using constants (i.e.
strings and integers), conditionals (i.e. ifthenelse), standard binary and unary
operators (ranged over by ♦b and ♦u respectively) for finite integer arithmetic,
and accessing variables of the environment (i.e. var). Additionally, two types of
expressions can operate on memories. The expression load (exp1, exp2, τreg,n)
reads n bytes from the memory exp1 starting from the address exp2. The ex-
pression store (exp1, exp2, exp3, τreg,n) returns a new memory in which all the
locations have the same values as the initial memory exp1 except the addresses
exp2 + i where i ∈ [0 . . . n− 1] that contain the chunks of exp3.
program := block∗
block := (string | integer, stmt∗)
stmt := assign (string, exp) |
jmp (exp) | cjmp (exp, exp, exp) |
halt | assert (exp)
exp := string | integer |
ifthenelse (exp, exp, exp) |
♦u exp | exp ♦b exp | var string |
load (exp, exp, τ) | store (exp, exp, exp, τ)
Table 1. BIL’s syntax
Hereafter we use ∆ to represent the set of all possible strings. These can be
used to identify both labels and variable names. We use τ to range over BIL
data types; let n ∈ {1, 8, 16, 32, 64}, the type for words of n-bits is denoted by
τreg,n and the type for memories addressed using n-bits is denoted by τmem,n.
We use T and V to represent the set of all BIL types and values respectively.
A program b is well-defined if it has no duplicate block labels and each block
has at least one statement. In the following we assume that all programs are
well defined. Notice that the program b is not part of the state, since it is not
allowed to be changed dynamically.
A BIL environment σ maps variable names (given as strings) to pairs of type
and value; σ : ∆→ (T × V ). Types of variables are immutable and any wrongly
typed operation produces a run-time failure. The semantics of BIL expressions
is modeled by the evaluation function eval: It takes an expression α and an
environment σ and yields either a value having a type in T or ⊥. The evaluation
intuitively follows the semantics of operations by recursively evaluating the sub-
expressions given as operands. The value ⊥ results when operators and types are
incompatible, thus modeling a type error, which in turn is used by the statement
semantics to cause the program counter to transition to the error state ⊥.
A BIL state γ = (σ, p) ∈ Γ is a pair of an environment σ and a program
counter p. Let L = ∆ ∪ B64 be the set of all labels, a program counter p is an
element of the set Λ = (L×N)∪{⊥,>}. While executing a program, the program
counter is (l, n) ∈ L × N, where l is the label of the executing block and n is
the index for the executing statement within this block. A successfully halting
program results in the program counter being >. Failures (e.g. type mismatch
or failing assertion) terminate the program and set the program counter to ⊥.
The system behavior is modeled by the deterministic transition relation b :
γ  γ′, which describes the execution of one BIL statement. In HOL4, this
relation is modeled by the execution function exc, which defines the small step
semantics of one statement.
The execution of assign (X,α) assigns the evaluation of the expression α
to the variable X. Let v = eval (α, σ) and t be the type of v, the value of the
variable is updated in the context (σ [X ← (t, v)]) and the program counter is
incremented. The statement fails in case of a type mismatch: v =⊥ or σ(X) =
(t′, ) ∧ t 6= t′.
The statement halt sets the program counter to > and thereby terminates
execution. The statement assert (α) just increments the program counter if the
expression evaluates to true (i.e. (τreg,1, 1) = eval (α, σ)) and terminates in an
error state otherwise.
The execution of jmp (α) jumps to the beginning of the referenced block, by
setting the program counter to (eval (α, σ) , 0). If the type of α is neither string
nor integer then the statement fails. The statement cjmp (αc, α1, α2) changes
the control flow based on the condition αc. The statement fails if the type of the
condition is not τreg,1 or the the targets (i.e. eval (α1, σ) or eval (α2, σ)) are not
valid labels. Notice that the targets of the jump are evaluated using the current
context, allowing BIL to express indirect jumps that are resolved at run-time.
4 The transpiler
The translation procedure uses a mapping of HOL4 ARM states to BIL states.
Every ARM state field is mapped to a BIL variable or to the program counter:
For example, the variable R0 represents the register number zero, the variable
MEM represents the system memory, and the BIL program counter reflects the
ARM program counter. This mapping induces a simulation relation ∼⊆ Γ × S
that relates BIL states to ARM states.
To transform an ARM program to the corresponding BIL fragment we need
to capture all the possible effects of the program execution in terms of affected
registers, flags and memory locations. The generated BIL fragment should emu-
late the behaviour of the instructions executed on an ARM machine. This goal
is accomplished by reusing the arm step function and the following three HOL4
certifying procedures.
– A procedure to translate HOL4 word terms (i.e. those having type B64, B8,
B etc.) to BIL expressions. This procedure is used to convert the guards
of the step theorems and the expressions contained in the transformation
functions.
– A procedure to translate a single instruction to the corresponding BIL frag-
ment. This procedure computes the possible effects of an instruction using
the transformation functions of the step theorems. It also symbolically exe-
cutes the resulting BIL fragment to demonstrate that it emulates the effects
of the translated instruction.
– A procedure that glues together the theorems produced for the instructions
to translate the entire ARM program.
To phrase the theorem produced by the transpiler we introduce the following
notations. An ARM program pi is represented by a finite set of pairs (adj , ij),
where each pair represents that the instruction ij is located at the address adj .
The predicate stored(s, pi) states that the program pi is stored in the memory
of the state s (formally, stored(s, pi)
def
= ∀(adj , ij) ∈ pi. read32(s.m, adj) =
ij). The predicate start-block(p) holds if a BIL program counter p points to
the first statement of a block. For readability, let γ = (σ, p), we use γ 6=⊥
and start-block(γ) to denote p 6=⊥ and start-block(p) respectively. We denote n
transitions of ARM states with→n, and n transitions of BIL states with n. The
translation procedure produces a theorem that resembles compiler correctness4:
Theorem 1. Let ad0 be the entry point of the ARM program pi. For every
ARM state s and BIL state γ, if stored(s, pi), s.sr.pc = ad0, and γ ∼ s, then
1. for every n > 0 if s→n s′ then
∃n′ > 0. b : γ  n′ γ′ ∧ (γ′ = ⊥ ∨ γ′ ∼ s′), and
2. for every n′ > 0 if b : γ  n′ γ′ ∧ start-block(γ′) ∧ γ′ 6= ⊥ then
∃n > 0. s→n s′ ∧ γ′ ∼ s′.
The meaning of the transpiler theorem is depicted in Fig. 1a. Each ARM in-
struction is translated to a single BIL block consisting of multiple statements.
4 The ARM and BIL transition systems are deterministic and live, thus the transition
relations are total functions. For this reason we omit quantifiers over the states on
the right hand side of transitions, since they always exist and are unique.
Assuming that the program is stored in the ARM memory, the state is config-
ured to start the execution from the entry point ad0 of the program, and the
initial HOL4 ARM state resembles the initial BIL states, then (1) for every state
s′ reachable by the ARM model, there is an execution of the BIL program b that
results (after n′ statements) in either an error state (γ′ = ⊥) or in a state γ′
that resembles s′, and (2) for every state γ′ reachable by the BIL program after
the competition of a block (start-block(γ′)), there is an execution of the ARM
program that re-establishes the simulation relation.
Error states permit to identify if an initial configuration can cause a program
to reach a state that cannot be handled by the transpiler (e.g. self-modifying pro-
grams or programs containing instructions whose behavior can not be predicted
by the step function). It is worth noticing that these cases can not be identified
statically without knowing the program preconditions (e.g. misaligned memory
accesses can be caused by the initial content of the stack where pointers are
stored).
4.1 Translation of expressions
In order to build the transpiler on top of the step function, the HOL4 ex-
pressions occurring in the guards and the transformation functions must be
converted to BIL expressions. For example, while translating the binary in-
struction 0x54fffe8c of Section 3.1 to a conditional jump, the expressions
s.p.Z = 0 ∧ s.p.N = s.p.V and s′.sr.pc − 0x30 must be expressed in BIL to
generate the condition and the target of the jump respectively.
Let e be a HOL4 expression, the output of the transpiler is the theorem
∀σ.A(σ) ⇒ (eval (α, σ) = e), stating that, if the environment satisfies the as-
sumption A, then the evaluation of α is e. These assumptions usually constrain
the values of the variables in the environment to match the free variables of
the HOL4 expressions. For instance, for the expression s.p.N = s.p.V the tran-
spiler generates the theorem ∀σ, s.(σ(′′N ′′) = (τ1, s.p.N) ∧ σ(′′V ′′) = (τ1,V))⇒
(eval ((var ′′N ′′ = var ′′V ′′), σ) = (N = V)).
If a HOL4 operator has no direct correspondence in BIL, the transpiler uses
a set of manually verified theorems to justify the emulation of the operator via a
composition of the primitive BIL operators. This is the case for expressions that
involve conversion of words to natural numbers and arithmetic operations with
arbitrary precision. A relevant example is the computation of the carry (over-
flow) flag in 64-bit additions. Following the pseudocode of the ARMv8 reference
manual [17], the step theorem contains the expression [x] + [y] < 264, where
x, y ∈ B64 and [·] : B64 → N is their interpretation as natural numbers. Both
the inequality and the addition cannot be directly converted as BIL expression,
because BIL can only handle numbers up to 64 bits. For the carry flag the tran-
spiler uses the theorem ∀n > 0. ∀x, y ∈ Bn. ([x] + [y] < 2n) ⇔ (x  2 + y 
2 + (x & 1) ∗ (y & 1) < 2n−1).
γs s''
⟂
{ 1 block }
~
s'
~ ~
n
n' n1'
1
ARM
BIL
γ' γ''
(a) The theorem demonstrated by the tran-
spiler
b = assert (αc)
assert(αm)
assign (tmpF1,var F1)
. . .
assign (tmpFn,var Fn)
assign (F1, αF1)
. . .
assign (Fn, αFn)
cjmp (α, α1, α2) # or jmp (α)
(b) The template of BIL produced
by the instruction transpiler
Fig. 1. Translating procedure
4.2 Translation of single instructions
The transpilation of a single instruction takes three arguments: the binary code
i of the instruction, the address ad of the instruction in memory, and a HOL4
predicate qm : B64 → B. The latter argument identifies which memory addresses
should not be modified by the instruction and is used to guarantee that the
ARM program is not self-modifying. In fact, a self-modifying program cannot
be transformed to equivalent BIL programs (due to BIL following the Harvard
architecture). If an instruction modifies the program code then then the trans-
lated BIL program must terminate in an error state. The predicate qm is used
to instrument the instruction transpiler with the information about where the
program code is stored.
An ARM instruction is translated to a single BIL block, following the tem-
plate of Fig. 1b. Hereafter we detail its generation and the verification of its
correctness.
The transpiler uses the arm step function to compute the behavior of the
input instruction i and to generate the step theorems [st1, . . . , stn]. These are
used to demonstrate ∀s.(read32(s.m, s.sr.pc) = i ∧ s.sr.pc = ad) ⇒ s→ t(s)
where t(s) = if c1(s) then t1(s) else if . . . else if cn(s) then tn(s), and cj and
tj are the guards and transformation functions of the step theorems respectively.
The behavior of the instruction can be soundly deduced by the step function
only if one of the cj predicate holds (see Section 3.1). The transpiler simplifies
the disjunction of the guards demonstrating ∀s.∨j cj(s) = ec ( where ec is
a HOL4 predicate) and translates it to a BIL expression αc ( demonstrating
∀σ, s.((σ, p) ∼ s) ⇒ (eval (αc, σ) = ec) ). The BIL statement assert (αc) is
generated as preamble of the instruction. Intuitively, if an ARM state s does not
satisfy any guard, then any similar BIL state (σ, p) does not satisfy the assertion,
causing the BIL program to terminate in a error state. On the other hand, if the
BIL state satisfies the assertion, then every similar ARM state satisfies at least
one of the guards, thus the instruction’s behavior can be deduced by the step
function.
The second task is to translate the effects of the instruction on every field of
the ARM state. Let f be one field of the ARM state (e.g. f = r(0) is the register
zero) and let F be the corresponding variable of BIL according to the relation ∼.
The transpiler uses HOL4 rewriting to compute the new value eF of the field (and
demonstrating ∀s.(t(s)).f = eF ). If eF = s.f then the ARM field is not affected
by the instruction and the corresponding variable F should not be modified by
the generated BIL block, otherwise the variable F must be updated accordingly.
The expression eF is translated to obtain the theorem ∀σ.eval (αF , σ) = eF
and the BIL statement assign (F, αF ) is generated. A complication raises when
there are instructions affecting several state variables, and whose resulting values
depend on each other (i.e. imagine an instruction swapping registers zero and
one, where t(s) = s with {r(0) = s.r(1) and r(1) = s.r(0)}). To handle these
cases, the translation procedure generates a statement assign (tmpF,var F ),
which backups the value of the variable F into the temporary variable tmpF .
Special care is needed for memory updates (i.e. f = m). The BIL program
should fail if it updates a memory location where qm holds. The transpiler in-
spects the expression eMEM to identify the addresses that can be changed by
the instruction and extracts the corresponding set of B64 expressions e1, . . . , en
(in ARM a single instruction can store multiple registers). To ensure that this
identification is complete, the transpiler proves ∀s, a.(∧i a 6= ei)⇒ (eMEM (a) =
s.m(a)). The expression
∧
i ¬qm(ei) (which guarantees that no modified address
belongs to the reserved memory region) is translated to obtain the theorem
∀σ.eval (αm, σ) =
∧
i ¬qm(ei). Finally the BIL statement assert(αm) is added
as further preamble of the instruction. If the ARM instruction modifies an ad-
dress in qm, then the corresponding BIL state does not satisfy the assertion,
causing the BIL program to terminate in an error state.
Symbolic evaluation of the program counter field is used to generate state-
ments that update the control flow. If epc is syntactically equivalent to if c then
e1 else e2, then the expressions c, e1 and e2 are translated to αc, α1 and α2, and
the statement cjmp(αc, α1, α2) is appended as last statement of the BIL frag-
ment. Otherwise, epc is directly translated to α and jmp(α) is appended to the
BIL fragment. Whenever possible, e1, e2, or epc are first simplified to constants,
thus reducing the number of indirect jumps in the BIL program.
To compute the effects of the generated BIL block, the transpiler uses a small
symbolic execution engine. The transpiler uses the intermediate theorems gener-
ated during the process to discard the hypotheses of the symbolic execution and
to instantiate the expression evaluations. Finally, it establishes the instruction-
theorem.
Theorem 2. Let i be the binary encoding of the instruction, ad be its location
in memory, and qm the predicate identifying the memory region used to store
the complete program. Also, let block be the generated BIL block, n be the
corresponding number of BIL statements, and b[ad] be the BIL block of the
BIL program b having label ad. For every ARM state s, BIL state γ, and BIL
program b if read32(s.m, s.sr.pc) = i, s.pc = ad, γ ∼ s, and b[ad] = block, then
1. if s→ s′ and b : γ  n γ′ then
((γ′ = ⊥) ∨ (γ′ ∼ s′ ∧ ∀a.qm(a)⇒ s′.m(a) = s.m(a))), and
2. for every n′ < n, if b : γ  n′ γ′′ then ¬start-block(γ′′).
The theorem shows (1) that if the complete execution of the block succeeds
then it behaves equivalently to the ARM instruction and memory in qm is not
modified, and (2) that completing the block requires exactly n steps.
4.3 Transpiling programs
The theorems generated for every instruction are composed to verify Theorem 1.
Property (1) is verified by induction over n, using the predicate qmem(a) , a ∈
{ad | (ad, i) ∈ pi}. This ensures that the ARM program is in memory after
the execution of each instruction, thus allowing to make the precondition of the
translation theorem (i.e. ∀(adj , ij) ∈ pi. read32(s.m, adj) = ij) an invariant.
Property (2) is verified by induction over n′. We split the execution of n′
steps (leading from the initial state to γ′) in two parts: n′0 < n
′ steps from the
initial state to the last state γ0 satisfying start-block and n
′
1 = n
′ − n′0 steps
from γ0 to γ
′. By inductive hypothesis there must exists n0 such that the ARM
program reaches a state γ0 ∼ s0 in n0 steps. Since γ0 ∼ s0 then the program
counter of γ0 points to one of the blocks produced by the transpiler. If γ
′ satisfies
start-block then we can use the corresponding instruction-theorem to show that
n′1 is equal to the length of the block. This and the fact that the ARM transition
relation is total enables part (1) of the instruction-theorem, showing that the
ARM instruction behaves equivalently to the BIL block.
4.4 Support for more architectures
In the following, we review the modifications of the certifying procedures needed
to support other common computer architectures, like MIPS, x86 and ARMv7.
The transpiler has three main dependencies: A formal model of the archi-
tecture, a function producing step theorems, and the definitions of a simulation
relation. There exist HOL4 models for x86, x64, ARMv7-M, and MIPS that are
equipped with the corresponding step function. On the other hand, the simula-
tion relation can differ for each architecture since it maps machine state fields
to BIL variables. In fact, the name, the number, and the type of registers can
be very different among unrelated architectures.
The expression translation has to handle the expressions of guard conditions
and transformation functions that are present in the step theorems. Since these
use HOL4 number and word theories, independently of the architecture, big
parts of the translation of Section 4.1 can be reused. There are two exceptions:
One is the possible usage different word lengths, and the other is the need of
proving helper theorems to justify the emulation of operators that have no direct
correspondence in BIL (e.g. for the computation of carry flag in ARM).
The transpilation of single instructions of Section 4.2 would produce BIL
blocks with a similar structure. However, the changed simulation relation can
affect the transpilation procedure. In fact, the BIL variables that have to be
temporarily saved and the ones that must be modified can be different, matching
the different registers. On the other hand, the expressions computing the state
transformation are the result of the expression translation and do not require
changes. Also, a jump instruction must terminate the instruction block to steer
the control flow dependent on program counter changes.
The verification of Theorem 1 by the program transpilation of Section 4.3
involves only reasoning on BIL and the theorems generated for the individual
instructions. This reasoning can be largely reused since the structure of these
individual theorems is unchanged. Even though our proof procedure for this is
fairly general, differences in the simulation relation might require slight changes.
5 Using the transpiler to verify binary programs
The output of the transpiler can be used to verify properties of the translated
ARM program. The verification work flow consists of three tasks, (1) proving
that the BIL program does not reach error states, (2) proving that the desired
properties of the BIL program hold, and (3) using the refinement relation to
transfer these properties to the original ARM program. Here, we show that the
transpiler output fulfills this purpose for four common verification tasks: Con-
trol Flow Graph (CFG) analysis, contract-based verification, partial correctness
refinement, and verification of termination.
Program’s CFG is essential to many compiler optimizations and static anal-
ysis tools. Furthermore, proving control flow integrity ensures resiliency against
return-oriented programming [23] and jump-oriented programming attacks [4].
In its simplest form, the CFG consists of a directed connected graph G, whose
node set is B64, and a root node ad0: The graph G contains (ad1, ad2) if the
program can flow from the address ad1 to the address ad2 by executing a single
instruction; The root node represents the entry point of the program.
Analyzing the CFG of a binary program requires to deal with indirect jumps.
Even if the source program avoids using function pointers, indirect jumps are
introduced by the compiler, e.g. to handle function exits and exceptions. For
instance, the ARM link register is used to track the return address of functions
and can be pushed to and popped from the stack. For this reason, the correctness
of the control flow depends on the integrity of the stack itself. Thus, verifying
the CFG (G, ad0) of a program pi requires assuming a precondition P , which
constraints the content of the heap, stack and registers.
Definition (Control flow graph integrity). For every ARM state s such
that stored(s, pi), s.sr.pc = ad0, and P (s), for every n, if s →n s1 and s1 → s2
then (s1.sr.pc, s2.sr.pc) ∈ G.
It is straightforward to show that CFG integrity can be verified using the
transpiler theorem, by defining a BIL precondition P ′ that corresponds to P ,
and by proving the following verification conditions.
Condition (BIL control flow integrity). Let lbl(γ) = pc be the label of the
program counter of the state γ, which is undefined when pc =⊥. For every γ such
that P ′(γ) and for every n1 and n2, if b : γ  n1 γ1  n2 γ2, start-block(γ1) and
start-block(γ2), and (∀n3 < n2.b : γ1  n3 γ3 ⇒ ¬start-block(γ3)) then γ1 6= ⊥,
γ2 6= ⊥, and (lbl(γ1), lbl(γ2)) ∈ G.
Condition (Transfer of precondition). For every γ, s such that γ ∼ s, if
P (s) then P ′(γ).
Contract based verification consists in verification of Hoare triples to establish
partial correctness. Let P (s) and Q(s, s′) be two predicates, representing the
pre- and post-condition of a contract, verifying that a program pi (starting from
the entry point ad0) meets the contract (P,Q) means establishing the following
property.
Definition (Contract verification). For every s such that stored(s, pi),
s.sr.pc = ad0 and P (s), for every n1, if s→n1 s1 then Q(s, s1).
Let PCend be the set of exit points of the program and End(s1) be s1.sr.pc ∈
PCend. Usually Q has the form End(s1) ⇒ Q1(s, s1), meaning that if the pro-
gram reached one of its exit points then the post-condition Q1 is satisfied. This
property can be verified using the theorem produced by the transpiler, by iden-
tifying a BIL contract (P ′, Q′), and by proving the following verification condi-
tions:
Condition (BIL contract verification). For every γ such that P ′(γ) and for
every n, if b : γ  n γ′ then γ′ 6= ⊥ and Q′(γ, γ′).
Condition (Transfer of contracts). For every γ, γ′, s, s′ such that γ ∼ s
and γ′ ∼ s′, if P (s) then P ′(γ) and if Q′(γ, γ′) then Q(s, s′).
Partial correctness is proved as a refinement using an abstract specification
and reusing contract verification. With composability of specifications in mind,
we assume that the specification is phrased such that domain and codomain are
the same. Let aout = fspec(ain) be a functional specification with the signature
fspec : A→ A.
Definition (Partial correctness refinement). For every s, a such thatR(s, a),
forall n1 such that s→n1 s1, if End(s1) then R(s1, fspec(a)).
Notice, that the refinement relation R(s, a) implicitly contains the mapping
from a to s and an invariant to enable establishing the refinement. By using the
assumption R(s, a), we can simply derive a verification condition in the shape of
the definition for contract-based verification, which can be proved as described
before. We call this the binary correctness condition in this context, where P (s)
resembles the invariant of the refinement relation, and Q1(s, s1) incorporates the
functional specification fspec with respect to the mapping of R.
The assertion of total correctness (or functional correctness) additionally
requires termination. Therefore, we consider the following definition, where the
precondition P should be not stronger than the precondition we used for partial
correctness (i.e. the invariant of the refinement relation).
Definition (Termination verification). For every s such that stored(s, pi),
s.sr.pc = ad0 and P (s), exists an n1 such that s→n1 s1 and End(s1).
To prove this property, we use the theorem produced by the transpiler (i.e.
the second clause of Theorem 1), identify an appropriate BIL precondition P ′,
and prove the following conditions.
Condition (BIL termination verification). For every γ such that P ′(γ), ex-
ists an n such that b : γ  n γ′ and End′(γ).
Condition (Transfer of termination conditions). For every γ, s such that
γ ∼ s, if P (s) then P ′(γ) and if End′(γ) then End(s).
5.1 Evaluation
Our contribution counts ∼4600 lines of HOL4 code: (1) ∼1000 lines for the syn-
tax and the semantics of BIL, the most of which are for the (signed an unsigned)
cast operators between bitvectors of different size; (2) ∼2000 for the expression
transpiler, a fourth of which proves the theorems handling arithmetic conver-
sions; (3) ∼1500 for the instruction transpiler, one third of which generates the
BIL fragments, and the remaining two thirds generate the proofs of correct-
ness; and (4) the remainder for merging the instruction theorems together and
generate the translation of a complete ARM program.
The whole proof-producing transpilation of an instruction takes ∼ 9 s on a
modern computer (Intel Core i7-6650U 2.2GHz). We follow a backward-proof
strategy; firstly, we generate the proof goal by invoking the step function, merg-
ing its output, translating the expressions and generating the supposedly corre-
sponding BIL code. This first part takes ∼ 1 s. The second part symbolically
evaluates the BIL statements. This takes ∼ 6.5 s, with each BIL statement re-
quiring between ∼ 0.5 s and ∼ 1.5 s. In the third and last part, which takes ∼
2 s, we prove that the simulation relation is established.
As described in Section 4.2, the translation of one instruction follows two
steps: (i) it translates the ARM instruction to a BIL block, establishing several
intermediate theorems (i.e. for translation of expressions), and setting up the
goal of Theorem 2, (ii) it demonstrates Theorem 2 in a backward proof, by sym-
bolically evaluating the BIL block and by using the intermediate theorems. The
usage of a backward-proof for this procedure provides a naive strategy to speed
up analyses: the user can rely on the goal produced in step (1) to translate the
ARM program to BIL without generating the corresponding certification theo-
rem. This certificate can be generated offline later. Step (2) can be optimized
with additional engineering effort by using a forward-proof strategy. Further-
more, program independent helper theorems can be verified once and reused in
this process.
We experimented with the transpiler using various unmodified binary pro-
grams produced by a standard GCC, including a bignum library and an imple-
mentation of AES encryption. The three C functions internal mul, newbn, and
freebn of the bignum library consist of 38 lines of C code, which are compiled
to 141 instructions. After transpilation, we obtain 907 lines of BIL code for these
functions. The encryption function of AES consists of 131 lines of C code (ex-
cluding the constant lookup tables used for the S-Boxes), which are compiled
to 535 instructions. With this example, we obtain 3920 lines of BIL code. We
observe that the average binary instruction consists of 6 to 7 BIL statements.
6 Concluding remarks
We presented the HOL4 formal model of the intermediate language of BAP
and the implementation of a transpiler for ARMv8 programs. This is the first
work toward this approach, and its results overcome two of the main barriers
in adopting binary analysis platforms to formally verifying binary code: the
lack of a formal ground to prove analysis correctness and the need for trusting
translation soundness.
The formal model of BIL can be used for verifying BAP tools, which are ISA
independent and analyze BIL programs, e.g., Dijkstra’s weakest precondition
propagation, transformation to single static assignment, loop unrolling.
In this paper, we focus on the ARMv8 architecture. To handle other ma-
chine architectures (e.g. x86, x64, ARMv7-M, MIPS), new transpilers must be
developed. Fortunately, the majority of the transpiler code does not depend on
specific ARMv8 features, but on the theorems produced by the step function.
There are several other HOL4 models for the main commodity architectures
that are equipped with the same functionality [10]. We comment on the required
transpiler modifications to support these architectures in Section 4.4.
Further research is needed to develop a complete trustworthy binary analy-
sis platform. For example, a trustworthy semi-automatic verification tool based
on pre/post conditions for binary code can be implemented by completing two
additional tasks: (i) a trustworthy verification condition generator to compute
the weakest precondition needed by the BIL program to meet the postcondition,
and (ii) a sound satisfiability solver for bitvectors to check if the precondition
entails the weakest precondition. For the first task, Vogels et al. [26] verified the
soundness of an algorithm for weakest precondition generation in Coq. For the
second task, Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers can be used. Bo¨hme et
al. [5] demonstrated HOL4 proof reconstruction for Z3 [18] capable of handling
the theory of fixed-size bit-vectors.
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